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SECTION I
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Scope of Study
 
The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of
 
public financing on the Joint Powers Authority,
 
The findings and conclusions are based on in-depth interviews
 
with officials of nine cities in San Bernardino County. The inter
 
views represented a sampling of the city managers, directors of
 
finance, and councilman.
 
This research paper not only contains opinions from those
 
public officials elected or appointed to the public sector positions,
 
but also attempts to measure the attitude of the public as to their
 
feelings towards revenue funding through the vehicle of the Joint
 
Powers Authority.
 
A sampling interview was conducted among the general public
 
in the nine cities considered in the basic inquiry. The cities con
 
sidered were; Ontario, Fontana, Upland, Montclair, Chino, Colton,
 
Victorville, San Bernardino, and Redlands.
 
These cities were selected because of the commonality of pur
 
pose and the general demographic characteristics within each of the
 
cities, all growing and experiencing the same rate of expansion.
 
Although some cities may now have a smaller percentage of minori
 
ties, the integration processes in the past five years indicate what in
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the future may be a more uniform demographic development.
 
All the cities selected for review are making similar efforts to
 
develop a business climate which would make it inviting for a busi
 
ness or industry to settle in their respective areas.
 
During the course of this study, a review will be made as to
 
how Revenue Sharing, Inter-governmental Transfer System, and
 
Regional Gbvernments may have influenced some Joint Powers
 
Authorities in San Bernardino County.
 
SECTION II
 
JOINT POWERS AUTHORITY - WHAT IS IT?
 
One of the great problems facing state and federal governments
 
today is taxation, its limitations by law, and its rejection by the
 
voters.
 
The requirements as a result of the population increase in this
 
state are vast and varied; i.e., schools, water systems, sewer sys
 
tems, flood controls, electric works, airports, harbors, police and
 
fire stations, administration buildings, and park and recreation
 
facilities. All these cost millions and some way to finance them had
 
to be created and developed.
 
There is an increasing number of people who are voting "no"
 
on any bond issue, no matter how meritorious. Thus the public
 
official knows that taxpayers are less likely to support general obli
 
gation bond^ issues because they add to the tax burden. These same
 
public officials also know that the majority of the voters need and
 
demand certain services from the state, county, arid local govern
 
ments, examples of which were noted earlier. This dilemma has
 
faced the public officials for the past twenty-five years and it is
 
interesting to note how it has been treated and to a large extent, suc
 
cessfully encountered.
 
One of the biggest problems facing the public officials when
 
financing is required to issue bonds is the State-required two-thirds
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voter approval for general obligation bonds. 
The two-thirds requirement was imposed in 1879 after a period 
of municipal financing disasters brought on by the extravagant 
issuance of bonds for internal improvements. In recent years, how 
ever, the two-thirds requirement has beeri seriously questioned. 
With the present level of fiscal sophistication of local agencies and 
their advisers, such a stringent requirement may no longer be 
needed. Its avoidance through the use of a Joint Powers Authority 
has been defended on the grounds that requirement of a two-thirds 
approval thwarts the willof the majority since it only takes one-
third of the voters plus one to defeat any general bond issue. The 
elected officials feel they are only carrying out the popular mandate 
by financing projects through other means. 
As an example, in the past seven years seventy-two percent of 
schoolbond elections have resulted in the failure to win two-thirds 
approval in order to issue the hecessary bonds. Had a simple 
majority been required, an overwhelming number of elections would 
have approved the bonds. (Appendix E) 
Attempts to remove the constitutional two-thirds vote provision 
by amendment have been unsuccessful. The United States Supreme 
Court in 1971 held,"So long as such provisions do not discriminate 
' against or authorize discrimination against any identifiable class, 
they do not violate the equal protection clause of the United States 
2 • ■ ■
Constitution." 
Such legislative and judicial solutions to overcome the two-
thirds vote requirement have not proved successful, more and more 
loeal agencies have turned to the Joint Powers Authority method of 
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financing to overcome their fiscal problems.
 
The Joint Powers Authority is a device available to local govern
 
ments by agreement without the need for further legislation. The
 
manner of creation permitted, coupled with the power of the Authority
 
to issue bonds under the Bond Act, offers great flexibility in the field
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of local financing.
 
In essence, this code provides for public authority financing as
 
follows:
 
A public authority may be created by a joint exercise, of powers
 
agreement between any two governmental agencies. The authority
 
may be given the power to perform any function which both parties to
 
the agreement are empowered to perform and which will be of benefit
 
to both parties.
 
The joint exercise of powers agreement sets forth the purpose
 
for which the authority is formed and the manner in which it will
 
accomplish this purpose. Again, it should be noted that the purpose
 
must be one which both parties to the agreement have the power to
 
accomplish and the accomplishment of this purpose must be of bene
 
fit to both. The agreement establishes the governing board of the
 
authority and the manner in which its members are to be named,
 
sets forth the specific powers granted to the authority and provides
 
for the conduct of its affairs, including meetings, financial affairs,
 
and the disposition of its assets.
 
An agency created under a joint powers agreement may be
 
given the power to issue revenue bonds. Under the Government Code,
 
the authority may issue revenue bonds by resolution of its governing
 
board to finance an exhibition building, a sports stadium or arena, or
 
any other public building plus, in the case of a county with more than
 
4,000,000 population, parks, and recreation facilities.
 
A number of such public authority projects have been initiated
 
throughout the State of California. In the Colton area, such projects
 
have been financed by the Ontario-Upland Treatment Plant Authority,
 
created by the cities of Ontario and Upland; the San Bernardino
 
Building Authority, created by San Bernardino County and the County
 
Flood Control and Water Conservation District(County Civic Building,
 
acquisition); the San Bernardino Public Safety Authority, created by
 
San Bernardino County and the City of San Bernardino (construction
 
of North Juvenile Hall); and the Upland Civic Center Authority,
 
created by the City of Upland and the San Bernardino County (library
 
and fire station construction). The San Bernardino Public Safety
 
Authority also plans to sell $7,200,000 of bonds to finance a Central
 
Jail. The Victorville Joint Powers Authority built a City Hall,
 
In each case, the project is leased to one or both of the parties
 
to the joint powers agreement and the bonds to finance the project are
 
secured by the rental revenues due to the authority under the lease.
 
When the bonds have been repaid, the lease terminates, and the agency
 
which has leased the project obtains title to it.
 
The bonds must be retired within forty years or less.
 
There is no legal limitation as to the amount of bonds which may
 
be issued by an authority. However, in actual practice, the amount
 
of bonds which can be successfully offered for sale is limited by the
 
amount of rent which the lessor of the project is able to pay. One
 
factor affecting the marketability of the bonds is the maximum tax
 
which can be levied by the lessor to raise funds to meet the annual
 
rental payment securing the bonds. However, revenues from any
 
available source can be used to pay the rent.
 
The financing is developed in the following manner for a project
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to be used by a city:
 
a) A joint exercise of powers agreement creating the public
 
authority is executed by the city and another governmental agency.
 
b) The site for the project is leased by the city to the authority
 
by means of a ground lease. The term of the ground lease is for a
 
period extending past the final maturity date of the bonds. If the site
 
is already owned by the city, it may be leased to the authority for a
 
nominal rent of $1, If the site is to be acquired as part of the project,
 
the ground lease may provide for the authority to pay the city an
 
advance rent for the site in an amount equal to the purchase price.
 
The city uses the advance rent to purchase the site. Funds to pay the
 
advance rent are obtained by the authority from bond proceeds,
 
c) The completed project is leased back to the city by means of
 
a building facilities' sublease. This lease extends for approximately
 
the same period as the ground lease,. It provides for the authority to
 
be paid an annual base rental sufficient to meet annual bond service
 
requirements of the bonds issued by the authority, plus an additional
 
rental to meet the limited operating expenses of the authority,
 
d) The authority governing board adopts a resolution providing
 
for the issuance of the bonds. In the resolution, the authority estab
 
lishes the terms and conditions of the bond issue and pledges all
 
rental payments and other revenues to the payment of the bonds. In
 
order to make the bonds marketable, the resolution establishes cer
 
tain other safeguards.
 
e) Because the city may not begin paying rent for the project
 
until it is completed and ready for use, it is necessary to provide for
 
interest during construction to be paid from bond proceeds. Usually,
 
interest is funded for a period of six months past the expected com
 
pletion date in order to provide for unforeseeable delays.
 
A reserve fund is established from bond proceeds and main
 
tained over the life of the bonds to pay principal and interest in case
 
revenues are insufficient for the purpose in any year. A trust fund
 
is set Up for an amount to cover expenses for one year. These funds
 
are available in the event an emergency should arise and a normal
 
payment cannot be made. In the event that no emergency should occur,
 
then the funds are used to make the payment for the final year.
 
Various types of insurance protection are afforded to avoid
 
default on the bonds in case the building is damaged to the extent the
 
city can no longer occupy and pay rent for it. In addition to the nor
 
mal insurance protection, it is usually necessary to provide business
 
interruption (rental) insurance and insurance against earthquakes.
 
Since the authority receives no rental revenues from the city until the
 
project is completed, funds to pay these insurance premiums must be
 
included in the authority bond issue. After completion of the project,
 
the city pays the authority an additional rental to cover the insurance
 
premiums, or in lieu of this, the city may obtain the insurance itself
 
on behalf of the authority.
 
A trustee is usually appointed to receive, administer, and dis
 
burse all of the funds of the authority. Appointment of a trustee,
 
which is usually a nationally-known bank, gives the bondholder an
 
additional measure of assurance that the funds of the authority will be
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properly applied and will be available when required to meet bond
 
service.
 
General criticism of this process is that it does not allow the
 
taxpayers to participate and make a choice to exercise their normal
 
right to vote on bonded indebtedness used to fund capital improye- ,
 
ments.^
 
SECTION III
 
BASIC BACKGROUND
 
For decades, the prime source of money for capital improve
 
ments has been derived from the sale of general obligation bonds by
 
the political agency responsible for its construction. Taxpayers
 
normally have a right to vote on bonded indebtedness used to fund
 
capital improvements. The authority to issue these bonds is the
 
result of two-thirds of all voters favoring the issuance of such bonds.
 
General obligation bonds are those for which debt service (which
 
includes interest and redemption payments)is either paid from the
 
General Fund or the General Fund is pledged as a guarantee against a
 
possible default in paymentfrom program revenues.
 
There are three categories of general obligation bonds: 1)
 
General Fund Bonds--those bonds for which the debt service is fully
 
paid from the General Fund; 2)Partially Self-Liquidating Bonds-­
those bonds for which the debt service is partially paid from the pro
 
ject or program revenues and the remainder from the General Fund,
 
and 3)Self-Liquidating Bonds--those bonds for which the debt service
 
is entirely paid from the project or program revenues. If project or
 
program revenues are insufficient to cover the costs of the partially
 
self-liquidating bonds or self-liquidating bonds, the full faith and
 
credit of the state is pledged to make payment from the General Fund.
 
The Joint Exercise of Powers Act of 1921, Government Code
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Sections 6500 et seq., authorizes California public agencies to enter
 
into contracts with other public agencies whereby an agreement is
 
made to exercise jointly any powers specified in the contract which
 
are held by all parties. Contracts may be entered into with the
 
federal or state government, the government of any adjoining state,
 
a county, city, public district or public corporation, any agency or
 
department of these entities. The agreement may be administered,
 
by one or more of the parties to the contract, a commission consti
 
tuted pursuant to the agreement, or a person, firm, or corporation
 
designated in the agreement.
 
In addition to other powers, any agency, commission or board
 
provided for by a joint powers agreement pursuant to Article 1, if
 
such entity has the power to acquire, construct, maintain or operate:
 
(a)An exhibition building or any other place for holding fairs
 
or exhibitions for the display of agricultural, livestock, industrial,
 
or other products;
 
(b) A coliseum, a stadium, a sport arena or sports pavilion or
 
other building for holding sport events, athletic contests, contests of
 
skill, exhibitions, spectacles and other public meetings;
 
(c) Any other public buildings;
 
may issue revenue bonds pursuant to this article to pay the cost and
 
expenses of acquiring or constructing a structure or structures or
 
facility or facilities which may include any or all of said purposes.
 
Local governments have justified the use of Joint Powers
 
Agencies to construct various capital improvements on the grounds
 
that the state constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote on
 
general obligation bonds is too restrictive. On many occasions,
 
local bond issues have reached votes substantially in excess of a
 
majority, but have failed to receive the required two-thirds vote.
 
Therefore, a. Joiht Powers Agency an alternative
 
financing method for various public improvemehts.
 
The League of Gaiifornia Gities ha^^ legislature
 
that it would support iegislation which would prbhibit the use and
 
limit of Joint Powers Agencies if the iegislature, in turni would pro
 
pose an amendntent to Article XfXl of the State Gpnstitution to lowet ^ )
 
the vote requirement on general obligation bonds to a rnajority.
 
The Galifornia Real Estate Association and other so-called
 
"taxpayers" groups have consistently opposed any such constitutional
 
amendment.
 
The Joint Powers Agencies were responsible for the building and
 
development of water treatment plants and flood control development
 
and sewage facilities, which were regional in scope' as well as local
 
city-county buildings, parks, and pools. ;
 
Prior to the development of this regional concept, the grouping
 
of the cities which are the subject of this study got along for many
 
years as a cluster of little settlements, each with its own character
 
and each with its own self-imposed isolationist thinking and attitude.
 
They finally realized that the regional approach to major problem
 
solving had become the dominant method for effectively developing the
 
whole area. These cities became aware that they had similar prob
 
lems and common interests, They did not have to sacrifice community
 
pride and identity, nor abandon competitive zeal. They then began to
 
look beyond their community and examine which of their concerns
 
transcended community and might best be viewed as regional.
 
This system of financing was creative and effective until about
 
1970 when nation-wide economic recessions hit sortie of the big
 
industries in California very hard; i.e., aerospace, shipbuilding, and
 
auto assembly plants.
 
Simultaneously, the taxpayer who becanie painfully aware that
 
his taxes were rising with each passing year became;rsluGtaat to vote
 
for any revenue bond, school bond, or tax override. During this
 
period of five years, 1971 to 1976, a total of sixty rtioney bills were
 
submitted to the voters by the county school Ipoa-rds in San Bernardino
 
County with only 28% passing and 72% failing. The general revenue
 
bonds Suffered the same fate. (Appendix E) ;;
 
The elected officials and city managers reluctantly went to
 
Joint Powers for financing of bonds. The electorate suddenly became
 
aware that they were being left out of the normal political process.
 
In the past five years, only one city (Chino) has resorted to the
 
use of the Joint Powers, "Chino Civic Center Authority," which was ^
 
financed in the amount of $4,500,000.
 
At the same time that there developed a reluctance to use the
 
Joint Powers Agency by all of the nine cities studied, a program of
 
federal revenue sharing and other grants and aid from the federal
 
government became a better source for money. Certainly it was
 
easier and cheaper to acquire.
 
Total grants from the federal government during the fiscal
 
year 1975-76 amounted to $13,274,851 to nine cities. Grants to total
 
revenue amounted frorn 4.7 to 27.8 percent of the total budget for the
 
respective cities. (Appendix A)
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The eities were recipients of federal revenue sharing, block 
grants, FAU (Federal Aid to Urban), Comprehensive Training Act, 
and the Public Works Bill. (Appendices B, C, and D) 
On 20 May 1977, President Carter signed two bills into law 
which are designed to provide 1,100,000 jobs, mainly among con 
struction workers and young people. 
: One bill authorizes spending $4,000,000,000 on public works 
projects, such as repa.irs to and Construction of schools and water­
works.
 
The other bill, part of Carter's economic stimulus program, is
 
a $20,000,000,000 appropriation rheasure, including $4,000,000,000
 
for public works projects, $1,OOO,OOO,000 for 200,000 youth jobs,
 
$8,000,OOO,000 for public service jobs over the next 18 months for
 
persons who have had problems in finding work, and $631,000,000 in
 
general aid for state and local governments.
 
By the $4,000,000,000 public works bill, the Congress hopes to
 
create 300,000jobs in the construction trades and 300,000 jobs re
 
lated to them. The $20,000,dOO,000 appropriations bill included
 
$4,000, 000, 000 to fund the program.
 
The public works bill extends and expands a $2,000, 000, 000
 
public works bill signed last year by President Gerald R. Ford, which
 
created 141,000 jobs directly in the constructioh trades.
 
On May 23, 1977, President Carter signed a bill for water
 
delivery systems to be funded in the amount of $235,000,000 for the
 
western states. General Revenue Sharing and other grants when
 
introduced into cities' revenue pictures can be additive to general
 
funds or substitutive for funds that would have btherwise been raised
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from revenue sources. It is for this reason that raising money
 
through Joint'Powers has become less important.
 
In order to raise the GRS grant, some cities have taken advan
 
tage of a bill passed by the California legislature, A report, dated
 
30 June 1975, on the effects of revenue sharing prepared at the
 
University of California, Riverside, states:
 
"We found one significant development regarding special districts
 
which has occurred as a result of the tax effort provisions of the
 
revenue sharing bill. In the first year of GRS, the California
 
State Legislature passed a bill which created a mechanism through
 
which cities can now get revenue sharing credit for the property
 
taxes paid to various kinds of special districts. Under its provi
 
sions, a city, by resolution of its council, may pay to such special
 
districts an amount of money equal to the amount the special dis
 
trict would derive from the imposition of its tax on all the property
 
within the incorporated limit of the city. In turn, the city council,
 
in order to generate the necessary funds, establishes a city tax
 
rate in the amount equal to the amount of the rate set by the
 
governing board of the special district, and the tax is formally
 
collected for the city rather than for the district. The result is an
 
increase in the city's tax effort and, therefore, in the amount of
 
revenue sharing money received, or, to put it another way, the
 
cities are penalized less in the GRS formula for having some of
 
their functions performed by special districts. In each case, the
 
council may decide each year which arrangement it wishes to make,
 
since the legislation allows the authorization to be made on a year­
to-year basis.
 
The cities have also discovered an opportunity, which has existed
 
for some years in the State Water Code, to make the same kinds
 
of arrangements with water districts.
 
Some cities in the study have taken advantage of these possibilities
 
and have thereby increased their revenue sharing amounts. On the
 
other hand, many cities have not taken advantage of the act. One
 
city in Southern California, for example, has no property tax;
 
however, its residents pay property tax to seven special districts
 
or service areas: a water district, a sanitation district, a fire
 
district, a street lighting district, a parks and recreation district,
 
a flood control district, and an airport service area. The city,
 
although informed of the nev/ law by the Local Agency Formation
 
Commission, has decided against action to return these functions
 
to the city in order to take advantage of the tax effort portion of
 
the GRS formula. In this case, political rather than economic
 
considerations are the deciding factors. The councilrhen wish to
 
be able to say that the city has no property tax.
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With this as background, the question arises, how Revenue
 
Sharing, Intergovernmental Transfer System, and Regional Govern
 
ments may have influenced some Joint Powers Authorities,
 
SECTION IV
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER SYSTEM, REVENUE SHARING
 
AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS
 
Intergovernmental Transfer
 
The primary form of intergovernmental cooperation is through
 
the transfer of payments. They are directed at specified purposes,
 
usually subject to a measure of supervision and review by the grant
 
ing government. Recent years have seen a substantial and ever-

increasing flow of funding from federal to state and local governments.
 
The transfer of financial assistance from state to local governments
 
has also flourished.
 
The federal intergovernmental transfer system has continually
 
grown since the early 19th century. The early grants financed by the
 
sale of federal lands were used for road construction and later to
 
establish and operate the land grant colleges. The land grant system
 
was a major factor in the development of the rail system in the letter
 
half of the 1800's. Supervision of these grants was relatively loose
 
but still significant. The few conditions attached to them governed
 
the mode of disposition of the lands and the manner in which the pro
 
ceeds were to be used for purposes specified.
 
The amount of the grants was rather modest until the 1930's,
 
when the desperate financial conditions of the state and localities led
 
to the development of a great variety of grants to help finance programs
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in education, health, welfare, transportation, housing, and other
 
fields.
 
Federal assistance has increased dramatically in the last three
 
decades. National aid, in absolute terms, has risen from $2.2
 
billion in 1950 to $60.5 billion in 1977. To put these figures in better
 
perspective, national government aid now represents 16% of the total
 
national budget and nearly 22% of the national domestic budget.^ For
 
many decades, almost all of this funding had gone to the state govern
 
ment, but by 1973, 25% went to local governments. The states receive
 
1
 
nearly a quarter of their revenue from the federal government.
 
Local government receives less than 10% of its revenue from the
 
federal government, but this does not include state aid which is funded
 
g
 
by the federal government and passed on to local governments.
 
The federal aid has almost exclusively gone to support basic
 
areas: education, income security, health and hospitals, , and high
 
ways. More recently, revenue sharing could be added to another
 
significant contribution.
 
Fiscal difficulties of state and locaTgovernments caused by
 
uncontrollable and controllable factors encompassing economic and
 
political considerations have led to their greater financial dependency.
 
Uncontrollable circumstances that face lower levels of government
 
are regional income differences and intergovernrnental spillovers
 
that take place whenever any portion of the costs or benefits of a
 
public service that is provided in a jurisdiction is realized by resi
 
dents of another jurisdiction. The degree of spillover may be cate
 
gorized by the far-reaching importance of a service in a region.
 
Education and air pollution have a greater spillover than neighborhood
 
■'parks..
 
A cbntrollable factor which interrelates with spillovers con
 
cerns the jurisdictional financial pbsturs. State governiTients rely
 
nripre upon inconne taxes while local rely significantly upon sales and
 
property taxes. These taxes are more slpwly affected by the changing
 
eCpnbmiC conditions. The inelasticity of these state and local revenue
 
sources (property tax) render state and loCal fiscal measures as
 
unsuited to cover the elasticity in the demand for services. State and
 
local governments have also ehcountered another difficulty in finane-

Tng programs. This problem arises from the limited success of
 
gaining voter approvdl to establish new tax bases or of rate increases
 
on present tax bases. (Appendix E)
 
The elastic ihcome tax structure of the federal government has
 
thus resulted in a greater revenue capacity but not the parallel advan
 
tage to subordinate governments in providing many governmental
 
services. The superior fiscal capacity can thus be used to entice or
 
persuade lower levels of government to provide given services. The
 
federal government has engaged in financial assistance to ameliorate
 
societal discrepancies. Thus, in reality, federal involvement has
 
usually served to stimulate the states' exercise of their own powers,
 
encouraging a great expansion of the scope of state governmental
 
operations. Such was the case with the construction of the inter
 
state highway system. This phenomena is becoming more prevalent
 
at the local level with the increase in direct federal-local assistance.
 
Federal transfers have striven for the redistribution of income
 
and the increase of service levels provided, thus enabling some
 
localities to rise above substandard service production levels. In
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3iddition to decreasing these inequalities, the Hoover Gommission in
 
1949 declared that grants had raised the leveT of all aided services
 
without transferring functions entirely to the hational governrhent.
 
However, in 19'78, the Hoover Commission's conclusion would be
 
violently disputed by local and state governnients,
 
The extent of federal control over these intergovernmental
 
transfers as well as the bypassing of state government to directly
 
finance local governments have been areas of debate. These issues
 
have influenced the composition of the method of transfer. The varia
 
tions of these tools are reflected in the mood of elected officials by
 
the degree of federal control required, as well as by the segments of
 
society served by grants. ;
 
There are numerous transfer tools available to enhance the
 
state and local fiscaL outlook, such as vacating specific revenue
 
sdurces, tax suppleraents, tax deductions, and tax'credits. Also to be
 
included are shared revenue, tax offsets, and grants or contracts
 
awarded to public and private applicants, such as federal grants to
 
universities. Of the transfer tools utilized, the most frequently used,
 
yet controversial, are the instruments of the direct transfer of funds.
 
Included in this group is the most recently implemented transfer sys
 
tem; revenue-sharing whose full impact has not been fully realized.
 
Another set of tools is the more established, categorical and block
 
grants which can be divided into projectj matching fund, or formula
 
allocation approaches.
 
Categorical grants are money transfers to lower levels of
 
government made without conditions of repayment, but exchanged for
 
specifically-defined purposes detailing the use of funds and the
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expected benefits. This is intended to result in the elimination of
 
unsound project proposals. Examples of acceptable purposes are a
 
particular type of highway or assistance for graduate programs in
 
speech therapy. Today over 95% of all national grants-in-aid fall into
 
this class. ^^
 
Categorical grants enable the higher level of government to
 
maintain control over the expenditures of lower levels of government,
 
greatly increasing the chance that programs considered important to
 
the national interest are initiated and implemented. They permit the
 
federal government to tailor its assistance to those activities that
 
have the largest spillover effects- Inadequate education, health,
 
anti-poverty, and anti-pollution programs in one area will mean costs
 
12
 inflicted on the rest of the country.
 
To ensure the proper allocation of funds, the federal government
 
maintains controls over the use of the funds. Recipient agencies must
 
supply some of their resources to support the program. These
 
agencies must, in addition, administer the program according to
 
prescribed standards.
 
The grants can be classified into two groups: 1) grant funds
 
earmarked for expenditures on programs or subprograms, and 2)
 
grant funds earmarked for expenditure on specified inputs to programs
 
or subprograms. The first group would be those which are restricted
 
to particular programs; e.g., unemployment, school lunches, etc.
 
The second group would be those restricted to particular kinds of
 
expenditures related to a specified program or department; e.g.,
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hospital construction, sewage disposal, equipment, etc.
 
Categorical grants are criticized for being focused too
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narrowly, in that jurisdictions can only spend monies for specified
 
types of projects. Much concern has centered on the operation and
 
impact of the grants-in-aid program. Critics have expressed fears
 
that these grants skew many local priorities.
 
Categorical grants have been criticized as making budget plan
 
ning difficult because many proposals may await judgment for months.
 
In addition, criticism has been leveled at the time and expertise
 
required to complete the complex application process. State and local
 
governments that are well-organized and staffed will win the project
 
grants. Yet they may have a relatively low index of need for the pro
 
jects or have a relatively high index of fiscal capacity with which to
 
meet their needs..
 
It is alleged that the federal carrot leads recipients to under
 
take activities that are not in their own best interest and that require
 
ments are frequently inconsistent with the social or economic prob
 
lems. Furthermore, agencies must pay some political price in
 
order to receive its benefits.
 
As the number of categorical grants increased after World War
 
II, administrators began to show concern about the inability to trans
 
fer federal aid from one closely-related field to another. This
 
resulted in the creation of the block grant. The block grant is funded
 
for a broad functional area. The block grant at the federal level was
 
implemented as an instrument to consolidate the numerous categori
 
cal grant programs. These groupings lead to greater flexibility with
 
specified programs and a more streamlined application process.
 
The 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act and the
 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 are examples of
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major block grants. CETA is another example of such a program in
 
which diverse manpower programs were greatly reduced. CETA
 
represents the legislative compromise between the centralists--those
 
favoring concentration of power in Washington and the proponents of
 
special manpower revenue sharing.15 The consolidation and decen
 
tralization of programs appear,to represent the major dichotomy
 
between categorical and block grants.
 
The great appeal for these grants has stemmed from fear by
 
state and local governments that an increase in categorical grants
 
will result in the concentration of power in the federal government.
 
By instituting broader categories, the federal government is demon
 
strating more confidence in the competency of lower levels of govern
 
ment.
 
Criticism of the block grant has centered on the reservations
 
expressed by federal officials that subordinate levels of government
 
are not able to address national priorities. The broader parameters
 
render less efficiency in the distribution of monies.
 
Other critics pointed out that while state and local officials may
 
gain under block grants, much of the original purpose of categoric
 
grants-in-aid will be lost. That is, block grants will provide stimulus
 
for particular types of functions, narrowly defined. In addition, appli
 
cation has proven to be very difficult because of the opposition of
 
federal and state bureaucracies, of interest groups who wanted ear
 
marked grants, of segmented congressional committees, and by frag
 
mented program administration.
 
Project as well as formulation and matching fund allocation
 
approaches can be applied to both categorical and block grants. These
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components of grants-in-aid significantly impact the thrust of the
 
many federally funded programs.
 
The federal government can apply different Congressionally-

set formulas to the distribution of grants. The amount of the grant
 
might vary with the unit size of the recipient. The subsidy does not
 
necessarily have to be fixed but it can vary inversely with the finan
 
cial ability of the jurisdictions.
 
Matching grant funds which apply only to the portion of expendi
 
ture that exceeds a specific minimum level are mainly designed to
 
encourage subordinate governments to initiate and implement new
 
programs. Grants for the entire amount can tend to weaken the state
 
or local responsibility motive. Grants without fund requirements are
 
related to the input or performance of the program. To measure
 
efficiency, greater emphasis is being placed on output or the perfor
 
mance standard.
 
Project grants are now matching fund grants which are distinc
 
tive from the formula grants in that a subordinate government must
 
prepare a detailed application for a project grant. Money is allocated
 
among all eligible recipients according to a plan established by law
 
or regulation. Certain Congressional guidelines are outlined, with
 
the discretion for allocation of project grants left to a national admini
 
strator who decides the merit of each application.
 
Project grants are directed to closely defined objectives. These
 
grants are made available for innovative programs and research, not
 
simply for supportive endeavors. In the mid 60's, more money was
 
allocated for formula grants, but the project grants were actually
 
greater in total number.
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The impact of categorical and block grants has been unques
 
tionably significant. The proliferation of these grants has generally
 
distorted American federalism. Since the inception of grants, the
 
control of these transfer tools has vacillated between centralized and
 
decentralized. The early sixties reflected a more centralized
 
approach, but by the late sixties and early seventies, decentralization
 
became evident. In pointing out this decentralizing phenomenon, .
 
revenue sharing must be acknowledged as an integral part of this
 
process.
 
Revenue Sharing
 
Revenue sharing has gone beyond block grants, by not requiring
 
matching, maintenance of effort, or prior project approval. Funds
 
are disbursed to the states on the basis of population, per capita
 
income, urbanized population, tax effort, and income tajc collection.
 
The funds are allocated to state arid local governments without
 
"strings" attached; however, certain general priorities must be met.
 
These areas include public safety, recreation, etc.
 
The primary purpose of revenue sharing was to offset fiscal
 
drag in the economy of the nation and in equalizing the fiscal position
 
of wealthy and poor governments. Overwhelming criticism of the
 
program has been that the revenue was spent on public safety instead
 
of on anticipated social service programs, that citizens have had
 
little input in the delegation of funding, and that governments have
 
been provided revenue unequivocably.
 
Regardless of the transfer tool, whether it be revenue sharing,
 
block, or categorical grants, the impact of each tool has had a major
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influence on all four areas of American government--federal, state,.
 
coTUXty, and local.
 
Regional Governments
 
Many political scientists, conservationists, legislators, and
 
local officials have pointed out that California's development over the
 
last three decades has epitomized what has become loiown as urban
 
sprawl. Traditionally, state laws and community practices in the
 
formation and alteration of local governmental boundaries and juris
 
dictions have followed the course of least resistance.
 
What the majority of local people desired, they were able to get.
 
Thus, in suburban areas, it has been easier to incorporate new cities
 
and form special districts than to expand the boundaries of existing
 
cities through annexation or to form regional governments. The effect
 
has been to satisfy subdivision developers and"home rule" advocates
 
at the expense of dealing effectively with government problems which
 
cross city and county boundaries.
 
Most of what passes for regional government in California today
 
is based upon the Joint Exercise of Powers Act of 1921. That act
 
permits local government(cities and counties) to carry out common
 
functions through the creation of Joint Powers agencies. The popu
 
larity of such agencies among local officials is due, in part, to their
 
flexibility. A Joint Powers agency may exercise all the powers and
 
duties of its constituent local governments or it may be limited to
 
single purpose.
 
Because of the great interest of regional government shown in
 
the San Francisco Bay Area, the Association of Bay Area Governments
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was formed in 1961 to provide a vehicle for the development of
 
regional planning for nine bay area counties. In 1961, forty-two
 
cities and five counties signed a Joint Powers agreement, setting up
 
ABAG as"a forum for discussion and study of metropolitan area
 
problems of mutual interest and concern to the cities and counties of
 
San Francisco area and for the development of policy and action
 
recommendations."
 
As a Joint Powers agency, it had no binding powers. However,
 
during the 1960's and 70's, its role has grown significantly, largely
 
as a result that it began to serve as the regional planning agency res
 
ponsible for the distribution of federal funds for programs in housing,
 
law enforcement, recreation, and pollution control, refuse disposal,
 
and shoreline development. In 1966 and 1969, there were efforts to
 
expand its authority as a regional home rule vehicle with tax and bond
 
capacity, but this was blocked by the state legislature.
 
During this period, there were a number of federal actions
 
taken to encourage regional planning and program administration. As
 
the number of federal grant programs multiplied, several federal
 
agencies sought to reduce the number of local jurisdictions and plan
 
ning districts with which they had to deal.
 
For many years, the League of California Cities opposed any
 
thing that looked at all like a step toward metropolitan or regional
 
government. The League openly stated that special districts that
 
could be controlled by city officials were the only agencies to be
 
trusted to deal with regional problems. In recent years, however,
 
the League's position has changed considerably. In January of 1971,
 
the League formally adopted a policy statement calling for legislation
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to create regional organizations throughout the state. These organi
 
zations, according to the League's policy statement, should serve as
 
"umbrella" organizations for all other regional agencies, operating
 
with "limited powers and functions with reference to the operation of
 
regional services" and with "such regulatory and taxing powers as
 
necessary to carry out the regional functions." Significantly, the
 
governing bodies of such organizations "shall be composed entirely of
 
city and county elected officials." (Even this was too much for the
 
Los Angeles City Council, however, which promptly went on record
 
opposing the League's policy.) ,
 
The County Supervisors Association of California, another long
 
time opponent of regional government, has also moved somewhat
 
closer to accommodation, but evidently with,great reluctance. Noting
 
that several "regional government approaches" to environmental con
 
trol had been proposed during the 1971 session of the legislature, the
 
association, meeting in October 1971, adopted a resolution stating
 
that"when it is necessary to form regional organizations to solve
 
problems of a regional nature...it is in the best interest of the people
 
of California to compose the governing,body of such regional orga.niza­
tions entirely of locally elected officials from units of general-purpose
 
governments--thus assuring local responsiveness and public visibility
 
and avoiding the needless superimposition of a new level of govern
 
ment."^^
 
It appears that one of the great fears by existing agencies is
 
thjat regional organizations, as has been proposed in California II
 
which would divide the state into ten regions, would culminate in the
 
development of another layer of government. This plus civic pride
 
and, in some cases, self-aggrandizement are central to the issue of.
 
workable regional governments.
 
SECTION V
 
CONCLUSION
 
The impact of public financing on the Joint Powers Authority
 
can best be determined as a result of a random survey, scientific and
 
literary research performed in the past year.
 
In a random survey conducted in the following cities: Ontario,
 
Colton, Fontana, Upland, Montclair, Chino, Victorville, San
 
Bernardino, and Redlands during the spring of 1977, seventy-five
 
people were interviewed on the subject of Joint Powers Authority. The
 
survey asked for answers to questions related to taxes and financing
 
of programs through such agencies.
 
The results are significant for they reflect the attitudes of a
 
cross-section of business men, members of a profession, working
 
class, and city managers, councilmen, and finance directors of nine
 
cities in San Bernardino County. By overwhelming majorities, all
 
interviewed were concerned about high taxes and impersonal govern
 
ment even at the local level.
 
Question; Do you know what a Joint Powers Authority is?
 
65% said"no;" 35% said"yes"
 
Question: Do you believe taxes are too high?
 
99% said"yes;" 1% said"no"
 
Question: Do you know what an obligation bond is?
 
65% said "no;" 35% said"yes"
 
30
 
31
 
After an explanation was made as to what an obligation bond was and
 
how a Joint Powers Authority m.ay use them,to fina.nce progra.nas, the;
 
following questions were asked:
 
Question: Do you believe you should have an opportunity to vote for
 
or against an obligation bond to finance a public authority
 
program?
 
90% said "yes;" 5% said "no;" 5% were "undecided"
 
It is interesting to note that the five percent who said "no" were
 
management employees in local government.
 
Question: Do you believe that it is possible to get two-thirds of the
 
majority voting to vote "yes" on a bond at the present
 
time?
 
95% said "no;" 5% "undecided"
 
To the question asked of those who are management employees
 
in local government:
 
Do you believe you would favor financing a program through Joint
 
Powers Authority by directly selling obligation bonds without asking
 
consent of the electorate?
 
100% said"no"
 
Some comments made by members of local government were:
 
Although I am in complete accord with the objectives of the Joint
 
Powers Agreement, I would hesitate to use the financing built into
 
such authority.
 
Joint Powers agreements are one aspect of the entire issue of local
 
financing. The subject is a sensitive one, but it had its use.
 
Government grants and revenue sharing have made the sale of
 
obligation bonds unnecessary.
 
We used Joint Powers financing one time and we are very proud of
 
the results, but I don't think we would use such financing today.
 
A militant one-third plus one of the voters can control the sale of
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obligation bonds and thwart the will of the majority.
 
I believe one man was speaking the thoughts of many when he
 
said:
 
The voter feels isolated, frustrated, and becomes very defiant at
 
the polls when asked to vote for an obligation bond. His vote is
 
no, no matter how meritorious the cause.
 
It is becoming very apparent that regional approach to govern
 
ment and its vehicle, a Joint Powers agency, is expanding not only in
 
California, but throughout the country. The financing of such agencies
 
has been thriving with the influx of federal funds with the following
 
effects upon Joint Powers Authority and other measures of control and
 
fiscal management:
 
a) Without revenue grants, sharing programs would have been
 
eliminated or cut in scope.
 
b) By financing on-going programs with revenue sharing or
 
intergovernment transfer, it frees the jurisdictions own resources to
 
permit a reduction in tax rates or an avoidance of a tax increase,
 
c) By substituting revenue sharing, grants, and intergovern
 
ment transfers, borrowing and use of general obligations bonds, in ,
 
many cases, are not required,
 
d) Grants-in-aid and intergovernmental transfers are used by
 
Joint Powers Authorities in regional planning or financing of many
 
functions, as water resources, sewage control, air pollution, and
 
highways,
 
e) Where Joint Powers Authority was formerly used at a local
 
level; i,e,, city, district, and county, revenue sharing grants-in-aid
 
and intergovernmental transfers will now support capital improve
 
ments.
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This innovative form of public financing which we discussed has
 
given local authorities and regional authorities the flexibility to mani
 
pulate and manage funds derived from normal tax sources, which
 
ability they never had before.
 
The great proliferation of federal and state grants-in-aid,
 
including revenue sharing as well as tax sharing and other inter
 
governmental transfers, and the development of regional concepts
 
have resulted in a generally cooperative relationship among all
 
parties. While these intergovernmental relationships have flourished
 
at all levels relieving the financial burden incurred by lower levels of
 
government, concern has been prompted by the unparalleled power
 
that the federal government conceivably could impose on subordinate
 
governments.
 
Many benefits accrue to the state through such federal inter
 
vention. The federal programs strengthen the ability of the state to
 
deal with problems generated by those enterprises within their boun
 
daries. Thus, in reality, federal involvement has served to stimulate
 
the state's exercise of its own powers, encouraging a great expansion
 
of the scope of state governmental operations. In some cases, the
 
actual fear of federal involvement has led to the reorganization and
 
improvements of state programs.
 
In summation, it can be said that the impact on local public
 
financing in the form of intergovernmental transfers, grants, revenue
 
sharing, and the necessity for planning on a regional basis is now
 
having a cumulation impact in popularizing the use of Joint Powers
 
Authorities. As long as this source of funds continues to be available,
 
the sale of general obligation bonds will not be resorted to in San
 
Bernardino to finance a public facility.
 
 APPENDIX A 
PERCENTAGE OF GRANTS RELATED TO INCOME 
1975-76 
Total Normal 
Grants Revenue Total % 
Ontario $ 879,036 $17,825,802 $18,704,838 4.7 
Fontana 537,555 3,073,177 3,610,732 14.9 
Upland 644,438 7,998,405 8,642,843. 7.5 
Montclair 1,080,000 5,250,000 6,330,000 17. 1 
Chino 482,000 7,700,000 8,182,000 5.9 
Colton 659,166 2,771,400 3,430,566 19.2 
Victorville 304,126 1,638,972 1,943,098 15.7 
San Bernardino 7,526,299 21,837,646 29,363,945 25.6 
Redlands 1, 162,231 3,025,044 4,187,275 27.8 
Total Grants $13,274,851 
Source: Finance Directors
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Revenue 
Sharing 
1975-76 $668,980 
1974-75 627,736 
1973-74 790,311 
1972-73 700,517 
1971-72 -
Revenue 
Sharing 
1975-76 $195,759 
1974-75 184,408 
1973-74 163,150 
1972-73 182,884 
1971-72 -
Revenue 
Sharing 
1975-76 $220,000 
1974-75 209,427 
1973-74 199,982 
1972-73 193,465 
1971-72 -
APPENDIX B
 
CITY OF ONTARIO
 
Population 66,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$386,358
 
160,592
 
405,874
 
486,840
 
108,906
 
CITY OF FONTANA
 
Population 21,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$841,796
 
303,077
 
131,914
 
201,583
 
115,627
 
CITY OF UPLAND
 
Population 33,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$424,438
 
181,046
 
168,984
 
154,302
 
60,226
 
Source:
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$17,825,802
 
12,722,995
 
11,972,256
 
11, 140,556
 
10,034,915
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 3,073,177
 
2,814,021
 
2,602,104
 
2,347,126
 
1,995,388
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 7,998,405
 
6,397,535
 
5,474,220
 
4,798,582
 
3,838,486
 
Finance Directors
 
of the above cities
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1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
1971-72
 
1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
1971-72
 
1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
19tl-72
 
:
 
Revenue 

Sharing 

$290,000 

290,000 

290,000 

290,000 

290,000 

Revenue 

Sharing 

$300,000 

271,000 

239,000 

243,000 

160,000 

Revenue 

Sharing 

$322,932 

359,789 

344,544 

336,577 

APPENDIX C
 
CITY OF MONTCEAIR
 
Population 23,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$790,000
 
360,000
 
250,000
 
100,000
 
85,000
 
; CITY OF CHINO
 
Population 21,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$182,000
 
165,000
 
127,000
 
220,000
 
150,000
 
CITY OF COLTON
 
Population 21,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$336,134
 
218,842
 
202,133
 
591,791
 
■ ■ Source: 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 5,250,000
 
5,250,000
 
4,500,000
 
3,300,000
 
3,100,000
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 7,700,000
 
5,800,000
 
5,300,000
 
3,800,000
 
3,600,000
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 	2,771,400
 
2,350,000
 
2,619,500
 
2,437,000
 
2,502,400
 
Finance Directors
 
of the above cities
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 1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
1971-72
 
1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
1971-72
 
1975-76
 
1974-75
 
1973-74
 
1972-73
 
1971-72
 
APPENDIX D
 
CITY OF VICTGRVILLE
 
Revenue 

Sharing 

$124,884 

118,377 

107,041 

117,184 

-

Revenue
 
Sharing
 
$1,857,643
 
1,913,128
 
1,892,369
 
2,541,125
 
Revenue 

Sharing 

$324,629 

319,830 

310,919 

350,203 

Population 13,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$179,242
 
104,722
 
30,124
 
111,350
 
65,935
 
CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO
 
Population 108,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$5,668,656
 
2,238,036
 
1,717,588
 
1,147,164
 
2,225,793
 
CITY OF REDBANDS
 
Population 36,000
 
Other
 
Grants
 
$837,602
 
254,795
 
32,002
 
138,720
 
79,812
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 1,638,972
 
1,492,651
 
1,334,213
 
1,058,376
 
911,615
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$21,837,646
 
19,605,271
 
22,831,731
 
20,977,842
 
18,551,233
 
Normal
 
Revenue
 
$ 	3,025,344
 
3,172,630
 
3,144,949
 
2,774,031
 
2,641,173
 
Source: Finance Directors
 
of the above cities
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APPENDIX E
 
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS
 
Voters' Response to Bond Issues, etc.
 
Bonds
 
Year Elections Passed Failed 
1971-72 6 1 5 
1972-73 5 2 3 
1973-74 2 b 2 
1974-75 3 2 1 
1975-76 7 4 3 
Total 23 9 14 
39% Passed 
61% Failed 
Tax Override 
1971-72 2 1 1 
1972-73 4 1 3 
1973-74 4 2 2 
1974-75 6 1 5 
1975-76 5 0 5 
Total 21 5 16 
24% Passed 
76% Failed 
Lease Purchase 
1973-74 9 2 7 
1974-75 6 0 6 
1975-76 1 1 1 
Total 16 3 13 
19% Passed 
81% Failed 
Grand Total 60 17 43 
28% Passed
 
72% Failed
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FOOTNOTES
 
^Revenue bonds have been traditionally defined as bonds which
 
are secured by a "special fund." These bonds are for specific pro
 
jects in which only the revenue generated from the program is
 
pledged for payment of the bonds. General obligation bonds are those
 
for which debt service (which includes interest and redemption pay- ,
 
ments) is either paid from the General Fund or the General Fund is
 
pledged as a guarantee against possible default in paymentfrom
 
program revenues.
 
2
 
Gordon vs. Luce, 403 U.S. 1.
 
California Government Code, Sec. 6547.
 
^California Government Code, Sec. 6500-6514.
 
^California Constitution, Article XVI, Sec. 18, ■ and"Article XIII, 
Sec. 40.
 
Parris N. Glendening and Mavis Mann Reeves, Pragmatic
 
Federalism (Pacific Palisades: Palisades Publishers, 1977), p.^152.
 
James A. Maxwell and J. Richard Aronson, Financing State
 
arid Local Governments (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
 
Publisher, 1977), p. 56.
 
Q
 
Robert D. Lee, Jr. and Ronald W. Johnson, Public Budgeting
 
Systems(Baltimore: University Park Press, 1977), p. 290.
 
^Daniel J. Elanzar, American Federalism: A View from the
 
States(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1972), p. 57.
 
^^Maxwell and Aronson. Financing State and LocalGovernments,
 
p. 74.
 
^^Glendening and Reeves, Pragmatic Federalism, p. 152.
 
12
Harvey S. Perloff and Richard R. Nathan, eds., Revenue
 
Sharing and the City(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 15.
 
^^Werner Z. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Govern
 
ment(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), p. 120.
 
^^Mcixwell and Aronson, Financing State and Local Governments,
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^^Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and
 
Public Policy(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), p. IT?.
 
^^Robert McPherson,"CETA - The Basic Assumptions and
 
Future Prospects," A Collection of Policy Papers for Three Regional
 
Conferences. A Special Report of the National Commission for
 
Manpower Policy, Special Report #14(Washington, D.C,: 1976),
 
p. 210.
 
California Journal, Vol. 2, No. 7, August 1972, pp. 217-220.
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